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ABSTRACT  
   
This thesis describes a synthetic task environment, CyberCog, created for 
the purposes of 1) understanding and measuring individual and team situation 
awareness in the context of a cyber security defense task and 2) providing a 
context for evaluating algorithms, visualizations, and other interventions that are 
intended to improve cyber situation awareness. CyberCog provides an interactive 
environment for conducting human-in-loop experiments in which the participants 
of the experiment perform the tasks of a cyber security defense analyst in 
response to a cyber-attack scenario. CyberCog generates the necessary 
performance measures and interaction logs needed for measuring individual and 
team cyber situation awareness. Moreover, the CyberCog environment provides 
good experimental control for conducting effective situation awareness studies 
while retaining realism in the scenario and in the tasks performed. 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The project that is the focus of this thesis involves the development of a 
simulation environment and test-bed for studying cyber security situation 
awareness. This project is part of a larger MURI project which aims to bridge the 
between the gap between human and computer understanding of cyber-attack 
situations. This is a multi-disciplinary project involving computer science and 
cognitive science. 
Cyber Security involves protecting the critical computing resources of an 
organization such as servers, software services, software applications, network 
connectivity and most of all, the internal information. A computer security hacker 
is an internal or an external agent who attempts to gain access to an organization‟s 
private network with malicious intents. The personnel trying to defend the 
organization from such attacks are called “cyber security defense analysts” or 
“computer network defense analysts” (used differently in different organizations) 
or simply “security analysts.” The security analysts use a wide array of tools to 
defend the network from malicious attacks. With the growing number of cyber 
threats, the security analysts are overworked, cognitively overloaded and stressed, 
negatively impacting their work performance [1]. This makes the organization 
even more vulnerable to attacks. This is because the current tools and 
technologies intended to protect and defend our networks are still in their infancy, 
though the attacks have become very sophisticated and organized [2]. One of the 
problems with current security tools is that they do not adequately support 
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situation awareness (SA) (SA is defined in chapter 3). Situation awareness is 
necessary for operators working in complex, dynamically changing environment 
such as the cyber security domain. The tools used by the operators in such 
environments must aid the operators in achieving that necessary level of situation 
awareness. To build such tools, we first need to understand and measure SA in the 
cyber defense context. Factors found that thwart or improve SA can be identified 
and tools and algorithms implemented accordingly. 
To study and measure situation awareness in such dynamic and complex 
environments, the real world tasks have to be recreated in an environment which 
preserves the critical complexities of the actual tasks and yet, provides the 
necessary experimental control. A Synthetic Task Environment [3] or an STE is 
one such way to achieve this.  
The objective of this thesis is to collect data on cyber defense analysis and 
use that data to iteratively develop a synthetic task environment (CyberCog) that 
recreates the tasks, interaction, and team collaboration prevalent among security 
analysts working in a cyber security defense team. CyberCog needs to provide a 
rich environment for studying and measuring situation awareness in the cyber 
defense context. Therefore, the resulting CyberCog system needs to demonstrate 
that it is a suitable platform for data collection and the measurement of situation 
awareness.  
This thesis, describes the iterative development of the CyberCog system. 
The first two iterations of prototype and evaluation cycles were conducted as part 
of a larger project. This thesis is particularly focused on refinement of the second 
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iteration based on information gleaned on the work of a security analyst. The 
objectives of this thesis are to 1) better understand the task of a cyber defense 
analyst, 2) incorporate this understanding in the CyberCog task at a level that non-
experts will understand, and 3) embed measures of analyst performance and SA in 
CyberCog. The accomplishment of these objectives will be assessed by 1) 
demonstrating refinements in CyberCog based on insights gained from the 
analyst‟s tasks, 2) a pilot study that demonstrates that the task can be carried out 
by non-experts, and 3) demonstration that data are collected with potential 
relevance to analyst performance and SA. 
The approach taken in this thesis is as follows:  Subject matter experts at 
security analysis helped to identify the key tasks performed by cyber security 
defense analyst and interactions that are prevalent among the analysts within a 
team. Based on this information the CyberCog system was refined in its third 
iteration. The system includes an attack scenario and metrics to measure analyst 
SA and performance. A pilot study involving three participants was conducted to 
demonstrate that the objectives were achieved in the CyberCog system. 
 
1.1. Problem 
Cyber attacks, over the recent years, have increased exponentially in 
number and in sophistication. New forms of cyber threats has shifted the cyber 
threat landscape from simple attacks such as script kiddies to attacks for monetary 
purposes, to attacks for espionage and after the stuxnet [4] attack on the Iran 
nuclear program, the landscape has a new entry: cyber weapon. The security 
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analysts defending an organization from such cyber attacks are overworked and 
cognitively overloaded with information that is affecting their work performance 
and more importantly, affecting their situation awareness [11]. However, there is 
insufficient knowledge about cyber situation awareness to develop tools and 
technologies for improving situation awareness and to alleviate cognition 
overload in security analysts.  
Governments around the globe have placed cyber security in their nation
’s top priority list [5] [6]. Private corporations perceive cyber attacks as their 
biggest threat. US Government networks are constantly facing a variety of cyber 
threats from private and state-sponsored organizations. Each day, the systems at 
DOD and Pentagon networks are probed and scanned hundreds and thousands of 
times [7]. In response, Government agencies and private corporations have been 
and will keep revamping their computer networks and cyber security divisions to 
better protect their information and infrastructure from such growing threat 
landscape [8]. More advanced tools, technologies and policies are being 
developed and are being added to the networks. More information and data are 
being captured and logged from the network.  
Each cyber security defense analyst or simply security analysts (used 
interchangeably) working at cyber security divisions now monitors thousands of 
alerts generated from hundreds of disparate IDS (intrusion detection systems) and 
security sensor systems during a single work shift. Existing IDS systems are 
known to generate a high volume of false alerts [9] [10]. Therefore the analysts 
use IDS alerts as an initial source to spot any malicious activity ongoing in the 
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network and subsequently to initiate a cyber-attack investigation process based on 
the findings. Later, to prove the presence of an attack (initially identified using 
IDS alerts), the analysts have to peruse large amounts of raw data logs or the 
network packet logs. The analysts also have to review such raw data logs to 
identify the source of the attack, the target of the attack, vulnerabilities exploited, 
etc. For each alert, the analyst is given only a brief description of the attack 
pattern that triggered the alert and a brief description about the alert itself. 
Therefore cyber analysts usually rely on their experience and training to spot 
relevant IDS alerts corresponding to real attacks amidst a preponderance of false 
alarms.  
The existing IDS tools and sensors use baseline network parameters to 
formulate an abnormal event [10] as well as known attack patterns from the attack 
signature database and the National Vulnerability Database to predict the current 
attack activity in the network and to generate an alert. With existing security tools 
unable to identify new threats, analysts also need to be aware of the current attack 
trends and the global threat level through online forums, mailing lists and 
intelligence reports to forecast unknown threats to their networks [9] to prepare 
for a future attack.  
This high information and cognitive overload on security analysts greatly 
affects their performance and decision making abilities [1]. The present day 
security tools and technologies do very little to address this vital problem. 
Situation awareness (SA) is also challenged because there is a large amount of 
disparate information available to the analyst, but very little correlated 
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information. Also challenging is the fact that the cyber situation and attack evolve 
at very high speeds [11]. These unique aspects of cyber attacks such as 
information overload and rapid pace, along with the physical factors such as 
fatigue, time, pressure, illness and anxiety make the analyst‟s job challenging and 
create a critical need for security tools and visualizations that addresses the human 
cognitive limitations.  
Cyber Security is a sociotechnical problem involving numerous 
individuals such as security analysts, engineers and system administrators 
interacting with an array of security related software tools.  Therefore tools and 
visualizations intending to improve cyber security situation awareness in them 
need to be tested using a test-bed that replicates the critical complexities of the 
environment and facilitates human-in-the-loop experiments. Such test-beds 
embody ground truth (e.g., presence of an attack) and will allow developers and 
evaluators to get real measures of threat detection performance, thereby 
determining if their tools or visualizations improve situation awareness in 
analysts. To our knowledge, there is no such available test-bed exclusively 
intended for measuring situation awareness in security analyst teams. 
To study situation awareness, an environment in which cyber defense 
experiments can be conducted with sufficient experimental control is required. 
However such environments are not available. Conducting SA studies in the real 
world cyber security defense environments or at cyber defense exercise (CDX) 
games are also not adequate since (1) such environments have limited ground 
truth availability needed to assess the performance which is an important metric in 
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situation awareness studies (2) such environments do not provide the 
experimental control needed for conducting experiments on different variables of 
study and across different scenarios. However these environments (actual 
operational environment and CDX environment) may be used to understand the 
work and to obtain SA requirements. 
 
1.2. Thesis Statement 
A synthetic task environment, simulating team-based cyber defense 
analysis work, can be developed for running empirical human-in-the-loop studies 
for measuring individual and team cyber security situation awareness and for 




This research makes the following contributions: 
1. Data on the work of security analyst which includes: 
a. Tasks of security analyst 
b. Interactions among security analyst in a team 
2. A Synthetic Task Environment, based on an understanding of the cyber 
security defense context.  This STE includes: 
a. A cyber-attack scenario and the corresponding datasets for the 
STE. 
b. Performance metrics and interaction logs for measuring situation 
awareness 
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1.4. Outline  
The remainder of this document is organized as follows. Chapter 2 
provides background on situation awareness, cyber security and situation 
awareness in the cyber security defense and analysis work. Chapter 3 presents the 
method adopted by CyberCog for measuring situation awareness in the cyber 
security defense context. Chapter 3 also presents the data obtained from running a 
pilot study for evaluating the system. Finally, the document concludes with a 
summary of this research and areas for future work. 
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Chapter 2 
BACKGROUND 
This chapter discusses background related to this research. First, a brief 
introduction on human factors and its importance is described. Next, definitions 
of situation awareness, steps to achieve situation awareness, team situation 
awareness and ways to measure individual and team situation awareness are 
described. Then, a brief description of Synthetic Task Environment is presented. 
Next, an overview of the cyber security domain is presented which includes the 
different types of cyber attacks in the threat landscape and the tools used by a 
security analyst. Next, the work of a security analyst is described. Finally a 
discussion on situation awareness in the cyber security context is presented.  
 
2.1. Human Factors 
Human Factors can be formally defined as “the study of factors and 
development of tools that facilitate the achievement of goals such as enhanced 
performance, increased safety and increased user satisfaction” [12]. It involves (1) 
Analyzing human interaction and tasks in a given context (2) Understanding the 
human capacity and limitations in performing the tasks and (3) Applying the 
findings towards the design and development of systems and tools 
A little history of human factors which also illustrates the importance: 
“After landing, pilots of Boeing B17s and B25s frequently retracted the 
landing gear wheels rather than the flaps. The consequence of this error was fatal. 
The problem was in the positioning of some key controls. The switches 
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controlling the flaps and the landing gear were right next to each other, and 
almost identical in appearance. It was not possible to move the controls further 
apart on aircraft that were already deployed, so Alphonse Chapanis, a pioneer in 
the field of industrial design, and is widely considered one of the fathers 
of ergonomics or human factors, modified the control by attaching a wedge shape 
to the control for the flaps and a small rubberized disc to the one that controlled 
the wheels. This eliminated so-called pilot error. This is one of the first 
documented incidents which gave rise to the field of human factors.” [13] 
 
2.2. Situation Awareness 
Endsley defines situation awareness as “the perception of elements in the 
environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their 
meaning, and the projection of their status in the near future” [14].  
Situation awareness involves being aware of one‟s environment (i.e., being aware 
of all the important events and changes happening in the environment). Systems may or 
may not support SA and in some cases systems may actually be the cause of cognitive 
overload and uncertainty. Situation awareness has been studied in complex and 
dynamically changing sociotechnical environments such as aviation, air traffic control, 
military command and control, and cyber security [15]. The example that follows 
illustrates situation awareness in one such complex environment-driving. 
Example: Bob is at a busy, unfamiliar city waiting to board a flight which departs 
in one hour and he also has a rental car to return. He is at the airport vicinity and 
is using his navigation system to find the exit for rental car returns. While looking 
at the navigation system he is trying to enter an exit only lane for rental car 
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returns. There is a vehicle in Bob‟s blind spot trying to enter the freeway and 
converging upon him. Bob is unaware of the converging vehicle and his attention 
is drawn to the car only when the other car honks. Due to Bob‟s attention towards 
the navigation system and due to the cognitive stress, Bob forgets to look over his 
shoulder while taking the exit and therefore becomes unaware of the converging 
vehicle. If Bob was situationally aware of all the surrounding vehicles, especially 
the converging vehicles on the exit only lane, he would have been more cautious 
while entering that lane and could have avoided the near collision. 
 
2.2.1. Achieving Situation Awareness: 
According to Endsley [14], an individual achieves situation awareness 
through a 3-step process as stated implicitly in the definition:  
Level 1- Perception: This is the first step towards achieving SA. This involves 
perceiving and knowing the status of various variables and elements in an 
environment by monitoring the variables, cue detection and simple recognition 
using memory [14]. Selective attention is necessary to achieve this stage [12]. 
Level2 – Comprehension: The next step is to integrate all the disparate 
information perceived during level 1 and subsequently gain a complete 
understanding of the current situation. This process involves pattern recognition, 
evaluation and interpretation [14]. Achieving this stage involves the human 
memory (working and long term memory) [12]. 
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Level3 – Projection: This is the highest level of SA achievable which involves the 
ability to project the future state and behavior of the elements in environment 
[14].  
 
2.2.2. Measures of Situation Awareness  
Situation awareness can be assessed in a variety of ways. Some of the important 
ways to measure SA are presented below. Techniques such as performance 
measures of SA, SPAM and SAGAT presented below are employed in this work.   
 
Subjective Measures of SA: 
Subjective measures of SA require individuals to rate the situation 
awareness they possess while performing a certain task. Participants performing 
real world tasks are stopped at certain intervals during the scenario and are given 
a questionnaire and scoring sheet to rate their current situation awareness (ex: 
Situation Awareness Rating Technique (SART) [16]). This approach has certain 
limitations in the fact that the users seldom know how much of situation 
awareness they possess at any point during the experiment. Halting a scenario to 
assess situation awareness may disrupt the subsequent task performance.   
 
SAGAT  
Situation Awareness global assessment technique or SAGAT is a 
technique to measure situation awareness in which the participant performing 
tasks in an experimental scenario is interrupted by making the interfaces they 
were using to go blank for a very short duration at random times. Then the 
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operators are asked questions related to the SA needed to perform the task. For 
example in a military command and control experiment the participant may be 
asked about the location of the nearest terrorist activity. The answers they provide 
are recorded and are evaluated against the ground truth to measure situation 
awareness [17].  
 
Performance measures of SA: 
Performance measures of SA are based on the outcome of the task. 
Therefore, the better the performance of the individual or a team, the better is 
situation awareness. Performance measures vary by experiment. Examples of 
performance measure are number of objectives achieved to the total number of 
given objectives, time taken to complete the task, the correctness of the task, etc. 
Performance measures are better than subjective measures because performance 
measures are objective and do not rely on the user to assess his or her own 
situation awareness. Also, by using performance measures to measure SA, the 
experiment need not be halted to measure or assess situation awareness. The link 
between situation awareness and performance is still under debate. It is argued 




Situation present assessment method or SPAM is another technique to 
measure SA. It is based on the assumption that SA involves knowing where the 
information can be found in the environment in order to get that information and 
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not in remembering the information as is implied by the SAGAT blanking 
procedure. Opposed to SAGAT, in the SPAM method the scenario need not be 
halted to measure SA. Instead, the probes are present as part of the task or 
scenario in which task and scenario related SA questions are asked. The query 
response is recorded for measuring the operator‟s SA. For every correct query 
response, the time taken to respond to the query is also taken as an indicator of the 
operator‟s SA [19]. 
 
2.2.3. Team Situation Awareness: 
A team is defined as a group of heterogeneous people working together 
towards a common goal [3]. The heterogeneity could be based on their individual 
skill, information they know, or their training or on the resources they have. 
Endsley defines team situation awareness (TSA) as “the degree to which every 
team member possesses the SA required for his or her responsibilities” [14]. The 
team‟s performance depends on the level of situation awareness in each of the 
team member. One member‟s poor SA can affect the team‟s performance. This 
view of TSA as an aggregation of individual situation awareness of members in 
the team can be categorized under information-processing perspective of team 
cognition [20]. In this view the team as a whole and individuals on the team are 
considered as information processors and therefore the cognition or SA measured 
at the individual level is aggregated to the team level [20]. This information-
processing perspective however has limitations.  For instance, this aggregation 
approach is relevant for homogeneous teams and not heterogeneous teams and 
  22 
this perspective may not suffice as teams increase in size [20]. Team situation 
awareness is  thought by some to be more than the sum of situation awareness of 
the individuals in the team [21]. According to this view team situation awareness 
emerges through the interaction of individuals in the team [21]. The team 
members through team interactions transform individual knowledge to collective 
knowledge and in the process achieve team situation awareness. Therefore, team 
situation awareness can be viewed as a combination of both individual‟s 
knowledge of the environment and team process behaviors such as interaction and 
collaboration. This view of team SA can be categorized under ecological 
perspective of team cognition [20]. According to this view to study team SA, a 
roadblock is inserted into a simulated team scenario and observations are made by 
monitoring the team interactions to determine (1) whether the team identifies the 
roadblock (2) how the team as a whole identifies the roadblock (3) what the team 
does to overcome the roadblock. The roadblocks are placed such that their 
performance will be affected if they do not identify and overcome the roadblock 
effectively. In this thesis team SA is examined under the ecological perspective. 
Therefore roadblocks need to be present in the experimental scenario and the 
synthetic task environment needs to elicit team interaction and collaboration.        
 
2.3. Cyber Security 
The term “cyber security” can be defined as the following:- 
1. “A set of activities and other measures, technical and non-technical, intended 
to protect computers, computer networks, related hardware devices and software, 
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and the information they contain and communicate, including software and data, 
as well as other elements of cyberspace, from all threats, including threats to the 
national security.” [22] 
2. “The degree of protection resulting from the application of these activities and 
measures.” [22]    
3. “The associated field of professional endeavor, including research and 
analysis, aimed at implementing and those activities and improving their quality.” 
[22] 
 
2.3.1. Cyber Attacks 
The current cyber threat landscape includes cyber attacks as simple as 
script kiddies to attacks such as stuxnet which is a potential cyber weapon [4]. 
Table 1 provides a list of all categories of cyber attacks. Most of the cyber attacks 
prevalent today are a combination of attack types belonging to different categories 
given in the Table 1. For example, an attacker could launch a buffer overflow 
attack on a system, exploiting an existing software vulnerability which will allow 
to attacker to gain administrator access or to install a rootkit. The rootkit can 
eventually be used to open a backdoor in the system which in turn could be used 
by the attacker to transfer personal information from that system to remote 
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Attack Type Description 
Malware and virus attack Software designed to infiltrate a 
computer without the owner's informed 
consent intended to disrupt the user 
operations, for privacy exploitation, to 
gain system administrative access, to 
open backdoors, for converting the 
machine into a zombie computer, to 
retrieve system information or to 
perform other malicious activity on the 
machine.[23] 
Denial of Service(DoS) and 
Distributed Denial of Service(DDoS) 
attack 
Dos or DDos is an attempt to make the 
targeted computer resource unavailable 
to its intended users by maxing out the 
available connection threads of the 
resource.[23] 
Botnets It is also known as a zombie army is a 
group of computers operated for 
malicious purposes by an attacker 
without the owner‟s knowledge. These 
zombie computers are remotely 
managed by a bot master who is the 
attacker.[23] 
Root kits They are software that is designed to 
hide or obscure the fact that the system 
has been compromised. Root kits 
enable an attacker to take control of the 
operating system by opening a 
backdoor to the system. They also act 
to evade the operating systems security 
scan and antivirus software giving the 
user a false sense of safety.[23] 
SPAM Attack It is the flooding of internet with the 
same message in an attempt to force the 
message on the people who do not 
otherwise intend to receive such a 
mail.[23] 
Software and hardware vulnerability 
exploitation attack 
These attacks exploit the vulnerabilities 
of poorly programmed software which 
includes desktop application, web 
application, web services, cloud based 
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services and mobile applications. Some 
of the most popular attacks in this 
category are buffer over flow attack, 
remote code execution, SQL injection, 
format string vulnerabilities, cross site 
scripting (XSS) and user name 
enumeration.[23] 
Mobile and Wireless attack They can be launched by pretending to 
be someone/something else such as 
Service Set Identifier(SSID) attacks, 
MAC spoofing , man in the middle 
attack, Wired equivalent privacy 
Wireless Application Protocol(WEP 
WAP)1.0 cracking etc. or they can 
result in direct denial of service attacks 
such as insertion attack, encryption 
attack and  jamming. 
Phishing Phishing is an act of sending an e-mail 
falsely claiming to be from an 
established and legitimate enterprise to 
a user in an attempt to scam the user 
into surrendering private information 
that will be used for identity theft. 
Pharming Pharming can also be called as 
„Phishing without a lure‟ is defined as 
“a scamming practice in which 
malicious code is installed on a 
personal computer or server, 
misdirecting users to fraudulent Web 
sites without their knowledge or 
consent”[24] 
Table1: List of Cyber Attacks and description of each of the attack 
 
2.3.2. Work of a Cyber Security Defense Analyst: 
Different organizations have different job tasks and responsibilities for a 
security analyst. The differences are generally due to the difference in the 
management approach, the size of the network, the operational domain of the 
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organization (Ex: Microsoft or UNIX or custom environment), organizational 
hierarchy etc. Such differences though exist across organization, the tasks of a 
security analyst at a high level in any organization is the same and include the 
following: 
 Monitoring Intrusion events, 
 Collecting and filtering computer network traffic,  
 Analyzing the traffic for suspicious or unexpected behavior,  
 Discovering system misuse and unauthorized system access,  
 Reporting to the appropriate parties  
 Take actions to prevent future attacks.  
Carnegie Mellon University (CMU) research classifies analyst's activities 
or functions into three generic groups: reactive, proactive, and security quality 
management [25]. 
 Reactive - Reactive activities are triggered by a preceding event or request 
such as a report of wide-spreading malicious code or an alert identified by 
an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) or network user complaints. Looking 
to the past, reactive tasks include reviewing log files, correlating alerts in 
search of patterns, forensic investigation following an attack and 
identification of an attacker who has already penetrated the network [25]. 
 Proactive – These activities are undertaken in anticipation of attacks or 
events that have not yet manifested [22]. Proactive tasks include 
identifying new exploits before they have been used against the defended 
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network, predicting future hostile actions and tuning sensors to adjust for 
predicted attacks [25]. 
 Security quality management- These activities are information technology 
(IT) services that support information security, but that are not directly 
related to a specific security event; these include security training, product 
evaluation, and disaster recovery planning [25]. 
 
2.3.3. Tools used by a security analyst: 
The different types of tools used by a typical cyber security analyst are the 
following: 
 Intrusion Detection Systems such as Snort monitors and analyzes network 
traffic data for any suspicious activity using pre-defined attack signatures 
from the signature database. The system generates alerts when network 
activity that matches an attack signature is detected. 
 An attack signature is a unique data pattern, such as network logs, that is 
used by an IDS system to identify malicious network activity. Attack 
signature database is frequently used by an analyst to fine tune the existing 
attack signatures, to add new signatures or to delete a signature which may 
be causing too many false positives to be produced. 
 Network activity and log analyzer such as Wireshark is used to view all 
the network activity in the network or view filtered activity, filtered based 
on IP address, time span, protocols etc. Analysts use such tools to find 
network activity, using filtering options, which caused the IDS system to 
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generate a particular alert. Analysts use such tools for further investigation 
after identifying interesting events using IDS tools. 
 Firewall rules are modified by analysts at some companies to block or 
allow certain incoming network traffic. 
 Patch management software is used by analysts at some companies to 
apply patches when the vendors make it available or when attackers 
exploit vulnerabilities in the unpatched systems.  
 Anti-virus tools are used by the analyst to scan for virus and to quarantine 
the virus. 
 Incident reporting tool is used by the analyst to report the presence of an 
attack along with findings to the forensics team for further investigation. 
This is usually implemented as a ticketing system wherein the analyst 
creates a new entry and ticket for the entry which remain open till the 
other responsible party closes the ticket. 
 Security Management software is an end to end integrated solution of all 
the above listed tools usually used by analysts in large organizations.  
 
2.4. Situation Awareness in Cyber Security Defense 
Transforming data to facilitate security situation awareness, as shown in 
Figure 1 is one of the prime objectives of an analyst. This data transformation 
process begins at the raw data level. Raw network data are the most elemental 
data in the hierarchy as shown in Figure1. Raw data are the network traffic data at 
the packet level. An Intrusion Detection System (IDS) analyzes such massive 
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amounts of raw data using pre-defined attack signatures and when it detects 
network activity that matches an attack signature, it generates a Security Alert. 
Therefore, an IDS filters out all the normal traffic or white traffic and allows the 
analyst to focus only on the interesting activity happening in the 
network. Interesting activity is presented in the form of IDS alerts to the analyst. 
[25]The analyst continuously monitors IDS alerts to spot any suspicious activity 
which is accomplished by recognizing alerts which may pertain to an attack 
through their experience or by 
interacting with other analysts. 
IDS alerts are plagued with a 
high volume of false positives. 
Therefore, the analysts need to 
perform a triage on IDS alerts, 
examining the alert data and 
the related network activity 
data, to weed out the false positives. This triage process helps the analysts to 
narrow their focus and to conduct further investigation on a smaller set of alert 
data which becomes their suspicious activity set. This is the first stage of SA 
which involves data monitoring, attack detection and recognizing patterns that 
may pertain to an attack [25].  
Now the analyst has to determine whether to report the suspicious activity 
as an event or not. Events refer to suspicious activity that an analyst has a 
responsibility to report, based on the organization‟s mission and policies and the 
Figure 1: Raw data to situation awareness [21] 
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severity of the attack, to the concerned teams such as the forensics. For example, 
an organization might be obliged to report only on certain types of intrusion 
attempts and not on employee policy violations (e.g., using unauthorized peer-to-
peer software); in this case, a policy violation would not be escalated as an event. 
To determine this, the analysts begin by integrating and grouping disparate 
suspicious activity based on certain common characteristics of the event such as 
the source and target IP addresses, time of the event, attack path, and attacker 
behavior. Along with this analysis workflow, analysts are also expanding their 
understanding of the suspicious activity they have by searching for and adding 
new facts that show the extent of the security violation including the actors, 
machines, and information that has been compromised. The analyst inspects the 
suspicious activity to gain as full an understanding as possible about that activity. 
If the analyst is confident that there is some attack or malicious activity taking 
place in the network, the analyst escalates the suspicious activity as a security 
event with all the findings for taking further actions. This is the second stage of 
SA which involves integrating data from multiple sources for gaining a complete 
understanding of the attack situation. [25] 
The CND analyst(s), after confirming the occurrence of one or more 
attacks or security events, prepares a formal report describing the incident. After 
any required approval, the incident report is released as an official analytic 
product.  
Intrusion sets are sets of related incidents. Intrusion sets commonly arise at 
the community (cyber security community) level. When a security community 
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suspects that separately reported incidents emanate from the same attacker source 
or sponsor, the community groups the incidents into an intrusion set. The 
community then increases attention and resources for detecting, understanding 
and responding to such incidents. Analysts frequently review such intrusion sets 
or incidents reported from different organizations. This process can include 
decisions about tuning data collection and IDS signatures to identify the newly 
found incidents in the future. This is the third and the highest level of situation 
awareness in cyber security defense context which involves predicting similar 
attacks in the future using newly created intrusion sets and attack signatures from 
the community. [25] 
 
2.5. Synthetic Task Environment: 
Synthetic task environments (STE) [3] are simulation environments built 
to recreate the real world tasks and cognitive aspects of the task in a lab 
environment for research studies. Synthetic task environment strives to recreate 
cognitive aspects of the real world task such as thoughts, distractions, analysis and 
cognitive overload with highest fidelity possible, giving less focus towards the 
appearance of the real world environment. STE differs from normal simulation 
environments in this aspect. Synthetic task environment provides better 
experimental control than uncontrolled field studies. Synthetic task environments 
not only provide a research environment but can also serve as a test-bed. The STE 
development starts by understanding and abstracting out the real world tasks and 
team process behaviors. This understanding is incorporated in to scenarios for 
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conducting experiments and studies. Then software and hardware is developed to 
create an interactive environment where the participants can perform the tasks 
within a scenario using the training provided. The software is also used to log 
participant actions and interactions and to collect objective and subjective 
measures based on the research requirements. 
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Chapter 3 
CYBERCOG 
CyberCog is a synthetic task environment that recreates the tasks, 
interaction and team collaboration of security analysts working on a cyber 
security defense team. CyberCog provides a rich environment for studying and 
measuring situation awareness in the cyber defense context. Individual SA and 
team SA are measured in CyberCog using data directly reported by CyberCog, 
SAGAT like knowledge elicitation methods and SPAM like probing methods are 
both used. Team interaction and collaboration are necessary features for 
measuring team situation awareness under the ecological perspective of team 
cognition [20] as explained in chapter 3. This chapter covers the CyberCog 
system including the requirements for the system, the approach taken to develop 
the system, a detailed description of the system and its components, and finally a 
discussion of the system evaluation, along with the data to support the evaluation. 
 
3.1. High Level Requirements 
The following is a list of high level requirements that should be considered 
while building a STE for cyber security situation awareness studies: 
 Primarily, the STE (Synthetic Task Environment) should recreate the tasks 
performed by a Cyber Security Defense analyst. 
 The STE must engage team interaction and collaboration. Observing team 
interactions, studies and measures on how individual SA is transformed to 
team SA in the cyber defense context can be made [20]. 
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 The STE should be successful in recreating the cognitive aspects of the 
tasks such as information overload and analysis process found in the cyber 
defense context. 
 Mixed Fidelity - maintaining realistic user tasks and information overload 
while using simplified attack scenarios and datasets. This mixed fidelity 
approach allows the experimenters to train participants who may not be 
experts in cyber security in a reasonable amount of time to perform real 
life tasks.  
 A team by definition is heterogeneous. Each person in the team must have 
some distinct role or responsibilities and must have some unique tasks or 
information. There may be information and tasks which is common to all 
participants. No one person should have all the information.  
 STE needs to be a distributed system enabling other MURI partners to 
take advantage of the system as a test-bed. 
 
3.2. Technology 
CyberCog is a distributed system built with the intention that eventually it 
can be used by MURI project members from other universities to test their tools 
and visualization. Each software interface is an ASPX page and is accessed 
through an Internet browser such as the Google chrome. CyberCog is developed 
using the ASP.NET framework and Microsoft SQL server. ASP.NET is one of the 
best and the widely used web application frameworks developed by Microsoft. 
Microsoft SQL server is a relational database from Microsoft, a preferred 
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database for application built using ASP.NET. Microsoft‟s ADO.NET entity 




An iterative and incremental development process was followed for 
building the CyberCog system. At the end of each development phase, the system 
was presented to subject matter experts and real world analysts to receive 
feedback on the scenarios, user tasks and information presented to the participant. 
This feedback process helped to achieve experimental realism. In addition to 
expert feedback the design of CyberCog was also informed by observations of 
blue teams (Cyber defense team) at work during Cyber Defense exercises  
We have completed 3 iterations of development and currently have a 
sufficient system which is ready to conduct experiments on situation awareness in 
cyber security analyst teams. The literature review and first two versions of 
CyberCog was team work while the third and the current version of CyberCog is 
my individual contribution. In the following section I will describe each iteration 
and will show how the feedback process has helped in evolving the system and 
how the current system is effective in measuring team and individual situation 
awareness in cyber security analyst teams. 
 
3.4. First Iteration: 
In the scenario developed for the first iteration of CyberCog three student 
participants worked together as a cyber security analyst team. Each participant 
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was assigned an attack based role such as Malware specialist, Denial of Service 
specialist and Phishing attack specialist. Each participant was trained to look for 
an alert pattern that is specific to his/her role. Each participant was also given a 
list of scenario specific cues which he/she had to use to identify the attack 
relevant alerts for that scenario. The cues were given to emulate the knowledge of 
a real world analyst. The intrusion alerts for each participant were composed of 
more than one type of attack. So if a participant encountered alerts which he/she 
was not familiar with or did not correspond to the given cues, he/she had to share 
it with the rest of the team to find someone who could respond to it. The team has 
to identify all the attack relevant alerts and submit their findings. 
Figure 2: Snapshot of CyberCog during the first iteration 
Last year we presented a working prototype of this approach, as shown in 
Figure 2, to subject matter experts in our MURI project team using a simple 
scenario and a sample dataset. We found the following: 
1. There are no such specific role names in the real world cyber security 
analyst team.  
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2. The work is not divided by attack types. The division of work is ad hoc. 
The teams organize themselves and split work in an ad hoc manner while 
responding to an attack. 
3. Other than intrusion alerts or events and network activity, an analyst also 
uses many other data sources such as system vulnerability information, 
systems and network information, websites and internet forums. 
4. The work of the analyst team does not end at identifying attack relevant 
alerts but they have to identify the affected systems, vulnerabilities 
exploited and also have to report their findings to upper management and 
the forensic department who take further actions. In some cases the 
analysts themselves conduct attack response and mitigation duties. 
 
3.5. Second Iteration 
In the second iteration, based on the feedback obtained on the first 
iteration, three participants performed the roles of security analysts. Each analyst 
now was assigned the responsibility of a sub-network in a fictional organization. 
Participants received a mix of common and role-specific training. For example, 
all the participants were trained on the fundamentals of cyber security and on 
attack types, whereas each participant received some specific training on 
vulnerabilities in servers or system in his or her sub-network and the cues to 
identify if those vulnerabilities had been exploited. Thus, as in the real situation, 
each team member had certain specialized skills. 
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After completing the training, the team was given a scenario and a 
network of the organization they had to defend. Each analyst was provided with 
two screens of data as shown in the Figure 3. The first screen presented network 
activity logs and attack events from the sub- network for which the analyst was 
responsible. A map of the sub-network alone was provided on this screen. Each 
analyst, using the training provided and by interacting with the team, had to 
identify the relevant alerts pruning off the false ones and then sharing them with 
the team. The other screen helped the analyst to share his or her findings and to 
take response actions on the findings collaboratively. Once the team reached 
consensus on a certain attack event and identified the affected system, they were 
given the ability to select a response action which included software patches from 
a predefined set to mitigate the attack. The team also had to identify the attack 
path by sequencing the relevant alerts identified. 
Each response action option had a certain cost associated with it and cost 
was relevant to the team performance score. The whole exercise had a time limit 
and the team has to defend the network within the given time. To measure 
situation awareness qualitatively we introduced dynamic factors into the 
Figure 3: Snapshot of CyberCog during the second iteration     
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environment to observe how the individuals and the teams were able to identify 
the change and take action to mitigate the threat [26]. Factors that impacted team 
performance included working on false alerts, applying a patch in response to a 
false alert, and the time taken to apply the patch in response to an alert. 
We presented this approach at the cyber situation awareness workshop we 
conducted in February 2011. Many real world cyber security analysts, security 
experts and cyber security researchers participated in this workshop in addition to 
the MURI members. The following are the key findings: 
1. A cyber defense analyst team is usually composed of 3 to 4 security analysts. 
2. Cyber security analysts work is not split by sub-networks. 
3. Cyber security analysts mostly monitor the inbound and outbound traffic at 
the network border. 
4. Network maps are seldom used. 
5. Each security analyst has a different work experience, training and knowledge 
about the attacks and alert pattern. For example they differ by domain 
experience: analysts working with Microsoft based systems and analysts 
working with UNIX based systems. Similarly some safeguard apache based 
servers, whereas others safeguard IIS based servers.  
6. Every day, security analysts monitor websites and online forums to keep track 
of new attack trends. 
7. Security analysts monitor intrusion alerts from tools such as Snort for the most 
part. 
8. Security analysts attend to alerts based on the priority or severity of the alert. 
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9. Security analysts classify incoming alerts into multiple categories such as 
unauthorized access, reconnaissance, false positive, denial of service etc. 
10. Security analysts spot interesting or attack activity based on the alert patterns 
which they know pertains to an attack through experience, training, research 
or through patterns newly found from online forums. 
11. Security analysts for the most part interact with other security analysts about 
the alerts they see and if they see unfamiliar patterns they tend to get help 
from other analysts in their team or outside their team. 
12. Security analysts interact with other analyst about their findings. 
13. Security analysts interact to identify new alert signatures for the novel attacks 
they have discovered.  
 
3.6. Third Iteration: 
The current version of the CyberCog is based on the feedback on the two 
previous versions as well as lessons learned from the cyber literature and cyber 
exercises. CyberCog is a web based application and therefore the software screens 
in the system are individual web pages accessed using web browsers such as 
Google chrome or Internet Explorer. Each participant computer is equipped with 
two computer monitors for running a total of six browser tab windows. Each web 
page corresponds to either a real world tool or a real world task. Four of the six 
web pages are operated using the left monitor and the remaining two web pages 
are operated using the right monitor. The four web pages, operated using the left 
monitor, are: (1) Event viewer (2) Network activity viewer (3) Classified events 
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viewer (4) One of these pages based on the analyst role: Network Map viewer, 
Software and hardware vulnerability query system, Website and Online forums. 
The two other web pages, operated using the right monitor, are: (1) Shared events 
viewer (2) Response planner. Each of the listed pages is described in detail later 
in this chapter.   
Each participant is trained to be a cyber security analyst in this simulation 
environment. Participants are given a mix of common and role-specific training. 
Therefore each participant is equipped with some specialized knowledge distinct 
from other team members. The specialized knowledge is assigned to participants 
to emulate specialized experience that analysts acquire. Each participant receives 
a distinct set of events or alerts on their event viewer page. The participant has to 
use the training, use team‟s help and other information sources to investigate 
further on each of the given events. The investigation process begins by perusing 
the network activity logs to find activities which caused the alert to be raised.   
This is accomplished by filtering the network activity based on the event source 
IP and destination IP addresses and a time value. Using the network activity logs 
the analyst will get more information such as the source of the activity, a possible 
user name responsible for the activity, the reason why the alert was raised and 
other supporting data. The analyst may also want to use other information sources 
such as network map, website information, employee or user database (to know if 
it is an insider attack) and vulnerability information to conclude whether the event 
pertains to an attack or if it is a false positive. The participants have to work 
together as a team to find all the attack relevant alerts, to identify affected 
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systems, to find the attack path and to plan a response action plan to mitigate the 
attack. 
 
3.6.1. Team Size: 
Three participants perform the roles of security analysts. This is similar to 
real life security analyst teams that are typically of size three or four.  
 
3.6.2. Training: 
The participants initially undergo a training process to work as a cyber 
security defense analyst team using CyberCog. They are first trained on general 
security concepts, terminologies and technical abbreviations. The receive training 
on the goals of the experiment, the tasks they have to carry out during the 
experiment and on how to perform the tasks using the CyberCog tool. They are 
then trained on how to carry out a cyber-attack investigation process, a multi-step 
process, using CyberCog. Each participant is then trained on a distinct set of alert 
patterns which pertains to an attack type such as Denial of service or buffer 
overflow attack. They are also trained on how to investigate in the event of such 
an attack, what actions needs to be taken to investigate such an attack and what 
response actions have to be taken to mitigate such an attack. This form of training 
is given to emulate the background knowledge of a real world analyst and also to 
obtain a heterogeneous team, comparable to the heterogeneity among actual 
analysts. 
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3.6.3. Scenario 
The team of analysts is given the responsibility of the network. They have 
to defend the network from attacks for some stipulated amount of time. During 
this period the team has to monitor for attacks using the intrusion alert system. 
They are not told if they would be attacked in the scenario. This way the 
participants are not actively looking for an attack from the start of the scenario 
and therefore a level of uncertainty is maintained. They have to classify alerts, 
identify if there is an ongoing attack, find affected systems and have to build an 
effective response action plan to mitigate the attack. 
The scenario used in this version of CyberCog is a multi-step attack 
scenario. This scenario was constructed based on the scenario reported by Peng 
Liu [27]. The attacker launches a 
buffer overflow attack on one of 
the vulnerable applications 
running at the webserver (IP: 
10.15.20.5) in the network. The 
map of the network used in this 
scenario is given in the Figure 4. Initially the attacker gets information about all 
running applications and services in the webserver using port scans and 
information retrieval queries. After launching a successful buffer overflow attack, 
the attacker executes a custom code in the server memory and gains 
administrative access on the server. On gaining administrative access on the 
webserver, the attacker next tries to gain access to the file server (IP: 10.15.59.3) 
Figure 4: The network map used in the 
current scenario 
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in the same network but situated in a different sub-network. The attacker does a 
scan on the file server to identify all the running services and open ports in the file 
server. The attacker then launches a buffer overflow attack on the remote 
procedure call (RPC) service running in the file server exploiting an existing 
vulnerability. Then attacker then gains administrative access on the file server by 
executing a custom code on the server memory. On gaining administrative access 
the attacker modifies one of the files to a virus. The systems which are mounted to 
the file server also get affected by the virus.  
 
3.6.4. Event viewer: 
This is the primary screen which the participants would use during an 
experimental session. This screen simulates an Intrusion Detection System such 
as Snort used by analysts to monitor network intrusion alerts. The screen, as 
shown in the figure, displays a list of events or alerts populated in real time. 
Events are produced throughout the session with a particular timespan during the 
session being the peak time when most of the important alerts are generated. 
Events are unique to each analyst where the analyst 1 does not receive the same 
list of events as the analyst 2 and analyst 3. The events received by each analyst 
are of different patterns and not just the patterns on which the particular analyst 
received training. This ensures a certain level of uncertainty in the participant 
about the alert patterns. The participant may get the help of another team member 
regarding the unfamiliar alert patterns. For each event the user is presented with a 
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source IP, destination IP, time at which the event was generated and event 
signature which provides a one line description of the event or alert.  
Key Tasks Involved: 
 Alert Monitoring: The participants monitor incoming alerts or events for 
any anomalous activity using the training given on the alert patterns.  
 Alert Starring: The participants are allowed to star events which they find 
interesting or which they think may pertain to an attack. This starring of 
events helps the participant to distinctly identify important events from the 
rest of the hundreds of events. 
 
Figure 5: Snapshot of the Event viewer software screen 
 Event Classification: The participants have to classify the events into one 
of the given categories such as false positive, denial of service, 
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unauthorized access etc. On classifying an event the event is removed 
from this list is populated in the classified events viewer page. 
 Event Sharing: The participants are given the ability to share unfamiliar 
events with the team to get help on how to respond to such an event. This 
is similar to interaction among real world analysts on a team. On sharing 
an event, it is removed from this list and is populated in the shared events 
viewer page. 
 
3.6.5. Network Data Viewer:  
The network data viewer page is used by a participant to access all the 
network activity or to access specific activity using filtering options. The 
participant is presented with all of the network activity and not just the activity 
corresponding to the unique list of events the analyst received in the event viewer 
page. This is similar to the real world in which every analyst has access to all 
network system logs. This page simulates the real world network activity viewer 
or packet sniffing tool such as Wireshark. For each network activity the source IP 
address and destination IP address of the activity and a brief description about the 
activity (in one line) is provided. More information about the activity can be 
obtained by selecting the activity using the select button. The more information is 
displayed in the payload text box. The kind of information presented in the text 
box varies by the activity. This is similar to the real world tool in which the 
payload information of the network activity is obtained by selecting the activity 
from the list.  
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Key Task Involved: 
 Data Filtering: The participants are able to filter the network activity to 
focus only on a small subset set of activity for which the participant is 
required to perform the investigation. The participants are allowed to filter 
by IP address and time span of the activity. The event information has IP 
address and time and therefore can used to narrow the search on the 
network activity. 
 
Figure 6: Snapshot of the network activity viewer 
 
3.6.6. Classified Events Viewer: 
The classified events page, as shown in figure7, is used by the participant 
as a placeholder to hold all the classified events. On classifying an event from the 
event viewer page the event is removed from the event viewer page and is 
populated under the corresponding category in this page. The analyst has the 
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ability to undo the classification and to move the event from this page to event 
viewer page. This helps the analyst to triage and focus on the important events. 
This also helps in measuring the situation awareness of the individual by 
assessing the accuracy of all classified events.  
 
Figure 7: Snapshot of the classified events viewer 
 
 
3.6.7. User Information Query system: 
The participants may use this page to get information about a particular 
user using a username. The participant may use this to know if the user is an 
employee or is an unknown user, the job profile of the user, the access rights of 
the user, etc. This information helps the analyst to identify false users, users who 
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Figure 8: Snapshot of the user search form 
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3.6.8. Vulnerability Information Viewer: 
The Analyst 2 participant has access to this page. The participant uses this 
page to find the vulnerabilities in a system and the impacts if that vulnerability 
gets exploited by an attacker. The participant may use this page to get more 
information about vulnerability in a system if the participant suspects that an 
attacker is trying to exploit a vulnerability in a system. Other team members have 
to request information Analyst 2 on vulnerability related queries. This creates one 
form of interaction between the participants and helps in measuring situation 
awareness.  
 
3.6.9. Shared Events Viewer:  
The shared events viewer page is used by the participants as a 
collaboration tool. On sharing an event from the event viewer page the event is 
removed from the event viewer page and is populated on this page. The 
participant has the ability to move the event from this page back to event viewer 
page by clicking the remove button. Only the owner of the event will have the 
option to remove the event. The participants share event information to get help 
with unfamiliar event patterns. Other team members may reply to a shared event 
with details and information on what needs to be done and how to carry out an 
investigation process for this event pattern. This interaction is very similar to 
interaction pattern among analysts in the real world. This interaction is therefore 
very crucial to measuring situation awareness. We can observe how each member 
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conveys his or her knowledge to other team members and how the member 
receiving it grasps all the information and turns it into effective actions. 
 
Figure 10: Snapshot of the shared events viewer 
 
3.6.10. Response planner:  
This page is used by the team as a whole to plan the response actions after 
identifying the attack and also to identify the attack path. The participants have to 
effectively collaborate to find all the affected systems and for each system they 
have to choose response actions to mitigate the attack on that system. Only one 
participant may actually use the tool at a time to plan, whereas other must 
collaborate with that participant to produce the plan. They may however take 
turns in making changes on the page. The other participants will be able to view 
the changes the participant is making on that page. The collaboration and 
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interaction taking place while doing this task is also very crucial in measuring 
team situation awareness. We can observe how each participant is effectively 
communicating his or her findings to the rest of the team and how that 
communication is helping the team to achieve complete situation awareness. 
 
Figure 11: Snapshot of the response planner 
 
Key Tasks Involved: 
 Collaboration: Collaborate with team members to identify effected 
systems and to plan response actions to mitigate the attack. 
 Collaboration: Collaborate with team to identify the attack path by 




  53 
3.6.11. Network Map viewer 
The Analyst 1 participant has access to this page. The participant may use 
this page to identify the system IP address. The participant would have to use this 
page to understand the network connections and reachability of a system. The 
participant would have to use this page to identify the network path. Making it 
available to only team member promotes interaction among the members when 
they sequence the affected network systems to find the attack path and therefore 
helps in measuring team situation awareness. 
 
3.6.12. Web Site Viewer  
The Analyst 3 participant has access to all the websites, online forums and 
external intelligence. The analyst has to effectively communicate the interesting 
and trending attack vectors to the rest of the team cautioning the team about those 
attacks. This way the team becomes vigilant towards such attacks. This 
information will also improve their confidence in responding to those attacks if 
found by them. 
 
3.6.13. Projector screen 
The projector screen provides the team as a whole a dashboard of all the 
information such as total number of alerts, the number of classified events by 
category and time left to complete the scenario. 
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Figure 12: A snapshot of the website like form reporting the latest attack trends 
prevalent in the world 
 
3.6.14. Dataset 
Dataset such as network events or intrusion alerts, network activity and 
vulnerability information used in CyberCog are a simplified version of the real 
world datasets. They are simplified to plain English format removing all the 
technical abbreviations and number codes so that a student participant who has no 
experience on cyber security is able to view it, understand it and communicate the 
information with the rest of the team. Having a simplified dataset also helps to 
train the participants faster to carry out the tasks of a real world analyst. The 
intrusion alerts are modeled using the snort alert logs from the 2010 Westpoint 
CDX games [28]. For example let‟s consider the following real world snort alert:   
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[**] [1:1616:10] DNS named version attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Information Leak] [Priority: 2]  
11/08-11:07:42.866316 10.2.195.248:50917 -> 65.190.233.37:53 
UDP TTL:61 TOS:0x0 ID:52888 IpLen:20 DgmLen:58 DF 
Len: 30 
[Xref => http://cgi.nessus.org/plugins/dump.php3?id=10028][Xref => 
http://www.whitehats.com/info/IDS278] 
The alert basically means an attacker is trying to query version and other 
such information of a about DNS server. So we convert this alert to this format:  
DNS: Information request query 
11/08-11:07:42  
154.241.88.201 -> 10.15.20.5 
 
3.7. Team Interaction 
Three main types of team interactions found in actual cyber analysis and 
which are relevant to situation awareness studies are recreated using the 
CyberCog STE. The first type of interaction, as illustrated in the Figure 13, 
involves interaction between one analyst who is unfamiliar with certain alert 
patterns and another analyst on the team who recognizes the pattern and helps the 
analyst with details on how to investigate such a pattern. This type of interaction 
about attack patterns is very common in real world analyst teams. This type of 
interaction is realized in CyberCog by training each analyst with a different set of 
patterns, emulating the varied experiences of real world analysts. Analysts who 
are unfamiliar with a certain type of alert pattern share it with the rest of the team 
using the shared event viewer page and the analyst who is familiar with such a 
pattern responds using the same page.   
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Figure 13: Type 1 Interaction: Team interacts to help each other with unfamiliar 
event pattern 
 
The second type of interaction, as illustrated in Figure 14, involves 
interaction among the analysts on the new attack patterns found at other 
organizations. The information is obtained by an analyst through websites or 
intelligence reports and is shared with the team. In this example we illustrate how 
an analyst‟s uncertainty regarding an event is resolved through such an 
interaction. The website-like pages provided to the analyst realizes this form of 
interaction. 
 




Figure 15: Type 3 Interaction: Team interacts to share the unique information 
they know 
 
The third type of interaction, as shown in Figure 15, involves sharing of 
information or data by one analyst who has access to that resource with another 
analyst who is need of that information. Each analyst in CyberCog has access to a 
Analyst 1 shares 





about the newly 
shared event. 
Analyst 2 knows 
how to 
investigate such 
an event  
Analyst 2 offers 
to help analyst 1 
Analyst 2 
explains the 
process to the 
analyst 1 by 
replying to the 
post on the web 
page. 
Analyst 1 receives an 
event for buffer 
overflow attack on 
the shopping cart 
application. 
Analyst 1 is not sure 
on whether it is an 
attack or false 
positive 
Analyst 3 learns from 
the websites that 
there is an ongoing 
buffer over flow 
attack on the 
shopping cart 
application they use 
Analyst 3 conveys 
this information to 
the team. 
Analyst1 is now sure 




The team has 
completed 
classifying all the 
events and begin 
to plan the 
response actions 
Analyst 3 takes 
the responsibility 
to enter the plan. 
Analyst 2 is 
consulted to 
know if any 
vulnerability in 
the file server 
was exploited 
Analsyst 2 finds a 
vulnerability and 
it seems to be 
exploited by the 
attacker  
Analyst 3 chooses 
patching the 
vulnerability as 
one of the 
response action 
for file server 
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unique source of information or resource.  For instance, Analyst 2 has access to 
the system vulnerability information. Thus, when other analysts need to know 
whether a vulnerability has been exploited, they interact with analyst 2 to get that 
information.  
 
3.8. SA Metrics 
Situation awareness is measured in CyberCog through a combination of 
performance measures, team interaction analysis, knowledge elicitation method 
using final incident report obtained from each analyst and SPAM [19] like 
probing methods. Such measures helps to identify teams with high situation 
awareness and by looking at that team‟s interaction and other team process 
behaviors, we can identify the reasons that these teams achieve higher situation 
awareness than other teams. These findings will be eventually used toward the 
design of tools and visualization for improving situation awareness in security 
analyst teams. 
The CyberCog STE is programmed to log all the actions performed by 
each analyst such as event classification, event sharing and event starring along 
with a timestamp to indicate when each function was performed. Each entry in the 
log is comma tabbed so that the output can be imported to a spreadsheet for 
analysis. The STE was also programmed to measure the performance of the team 
at the end of an experiment session. 
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The next section covers performance measures, user action logs and 
reports obtained from the pilot test and how such data can be used to ensure 
situation awareness in cyber security analyst teams. 
 
Event Starred Report: 
An event starred report for each analyst has a list of all the events or alerts 
that were marked as important by the analyst. Each participant analyst has an 
option to mark events which they find as suspicious activity to distinctly identify 
it from the rest. The report output looks like this: 
192.121.86.47,10.15.20.10,WEB-PHP: Cross Site scripting attack attempted,6/28/2011 
3:34:28 PM,6/28/2011 3:34:44 PM 
 
Each entry in this report logs the event data such as the source IP, 
destination IP address associated with the event, the event description to identify 
which event was marked important. Each entry also has the time at which the 
event was generated and time at which the event was marked as important. The 
description given is in the same order as it appears in the log entry starting with 
source IP address. This report helps the experimenter to know if each analyst has 
noticed an important event and the timestamps in the entry will help in 
determining the time taken by the analysts to notice each event. This real time 
probing technique is similar to the probing technique used in the SPAM method 
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Event Classified Report: 
An event classified report for each analyst has a list of all the events or 
alerts that were classified by the analyst as belonging to one of the given 
categories. The report output looks like this:  
224.0.0.14,10.15.20.10,Web-Server: Port Scan attempt,6/28/2011 3:20:58 
PM,6/28/2011 3:48:42 PM,Recon 
134.240.12.254 ,10.15.20.5,WebServer: Data received beyond the 
timestamp,6/28/2011 3:18:51 PM,6/28/2011 3:50:31 PM,False 
Each log entry starts with a source IP address then destination address, 
event description, time the event was generated and time the event was classified 
and the category to which the event was classified. These logs will indicate events 
that were correctly identified by each analyst and the time taken by the analyst to 
classify it. These logs will also help identify which alerts were classified 
erroneously.  The reason for misclassification can be learned by listening to the 
audio logs captured for that time period for that analyst.  
 
Network Filter Used Report: 
The network filter used report for each analyst has a list of all the filter 
queries used by the analyst while conducting the attack investigation. The report 
output looks like this: 
135.46.574.26,10.15.20.8,6/28/2011 3:34:00 PM,6/28/2011 3:42:00 PM 
10.30.4.6,132.15.623.4,6/28/2011 3:34:00 PM,6/28/2011 3:45:00 PM 
Each log entry starts with a source IP and destination IP, address of the 
network activity the analyst wants within a time span given by the timestamps 
following the IP address in the each entry. This information highlights whether 
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the analyst is looking for the correct relevant network data pertaining to the attack 
taking place in the network which in turn is an indicator of situation awareness.  
 
User Search Report: 
A user search report for each analyst has a list of all the usernames 
examined by the analyst. Some network activity data provides usernames of the 
people initiating the traffic. The analyst examines such usernames to determine if 
the activity is generated by an insider or an unknown user and to know if the user 
performing this activity has the rights to perform the activity. The report output 
looks like this:  
6/28/2011 3:44:19 PM,kkerry,Is a staff at the company. Has access to workstations and 
FTP server 
6/28/2011 3:51:37 PM,jKing,Works on web applications. Performs changes on 
webserver files. Fix errors in web applications 
Each log entry has the time at which the lookup was made, the username 
looked up and permissions of the user. This log indicates whether the analyst was 
able to differentiate activity initiated by authorized and legitimate users to the 
activity initiated by a malicious user. 
Event Shared Report: 
An event shared report for each analyst has a list of all the events or alerts 
that were shared by the analyst with the rest of the team for getting help in 
investigating unknown alert patterns. The report output looks like this: 
162.154.26.34,10.30.4.5,Workstation: UnCertified freeware dowloaded from 
http://sourceforge.net - possible virus,6/28/2011 3:31:28 PM,6/28/2011 3:43:03 PM 
154.241.88.201,10.15.20.5,WEB Server: Buffer Overlow attempt on the shoppingcart. 
Exe,6/28/2011 3:37:10 PM,6/28/2011 3:46:23 PM 
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Each entry provides the details of the event that was shared by the analyst, 
time at which it was generated and the time at which it was shared. The replies to 
the shared events are stored in the database. The database output in CSV (Comma 
Separate Value) format is: 
1,47,Workstation: UnCertified freeware dowloaded from http://sourceforge.net - 
possible virus,2,3,find out who downloaded the app.. find the user name .. ifthe user is 
an internal user .. they u can classify it as false...and if there is no user it pertains to 
attack ...,2011-06-28 15:48:24.423 
Each entry has some database table IDS, then the event description, then 
the analyst number who posted the event, then the analyst number who replied to 
the event and then the actual reply. The combination of these two data source 
captures the actual interaction (interaction type 1) between analysts on the alert 
patterns. For example in the given logs Analyst 2 needs help on the event 
“Workstation: UnCertified freeware dowloaded from http://sourceforge.net - possible virus” for 
which Analyst 3 responds like this “find out who downloaded the app.. find the user name 
.. ifthe user is an internal user .. they u can classify it as false...and if there is no user it pertains to 
attack ...,”. This is a rich source of information to analyze team interaction and for 
studying team situation awareness. 
 
Final Incident Report and Confidence score: 
At the end of the session after the team has submitted their findings, each 
analyst participant is asked to fill out an individual incident report in which they 
have to describe in few lines their understanding of the situation. This is a report 
that elicits each individual‟s knowledge about the situation and will help us to 
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determine the difference and similarity in understanding at the team level. Analyst 
participants are also asked to assess their confidence level regarding their work.  
Table 2: List of performance measures with a brief description 
 
Team Performance Score: 
At the end of each scenario a team performance score is calculated by 
comparing the team‟s findings with the correct solution. Performance measures 
collected from multiple teams and for multiple scenarios are good objective 
measures of situation awareness. The higher the performance score, the higher the 
situation awareness of the team. The Table 2 provides the list of all components 










 Score Name Score Description 
1 Attack Events 
This is the percentage of number of events correctly 
classified as attack events  
2 False Events 
This is the percentage of number of events correctly 
classified as false events  
3 Recon Events 
This is the percentage of number of events correctly 
classified as Reconnaissance events 
4 Failed Events 
This is the percentage of number of events correctly 




This is the percentage of number of systems correctly 




A correct or wrong score for the response action plan 
submitted.  
7 Attack Path A correct or wrong score for the attack path identified 
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Chapter 4 
EVALUATION 
The objectives of this thesis were to 1) better understand the task of a 
cyber defense analyst, 2) incorporate this understanding in the CyberCog task at a 
level that non-experts will understand, and 3) embed measures of analyst 
performance and SA in Cybercog.  These objectives have been accomplished in 
this thesis. Supporting evidence is summarized in this section.  
 
1) Refinements in CyberCog that are based on insights gained from the analysts‟ 
tasks have been demonstrated:  
 Training each participant analyst on distinct attack patterns emulates the 
varying work experience and specialization of analysts in a real world 
team. 
 Monitoring events on the Event Viewer page is very close to the way real 
world analyst monitor IDS alerts. The number of alerts per analyst used in 
CyberCog is based on the CDX games conducted by NSA in 2009 [28]  
 Classifying events to different categories on the Event Viewer page is very 
similar to the event classification function of the analyst. 
 The attack investigation process which involves the participant analyst 
using other information sources such as Network Data viewer, 
Vulnerability Information Viewer recreates the real world investigation 
process in a simplified manner. 
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 Interactions and discussions conducted by participants on the Shared 
Events Viewer page captures the real world interaction among analysts 
involving unfamiliar events and attack patterns. 
 
2) A pilot study on a three participant team was conducted and the observations 
from the study demonstrate that the task can been carried out by non-experts. 
The participants monitored the given events on the Event Viewer page and 
starred some of the events to be important. The starred event logs for each of the 
analysts logged such activity. The actual starred event logs from the pilot study 
are given below. Each log entry shows the time and date when the event was 
generated and time and date when the event was starred as important. 
 
Starred event logs from the pilot study: 
192.121.86.47,10.15.20.10,WEB-PHP: Cross Site scripting attack 
attempted,6/28/2011 3:34:28    PM,6/28/2011 3:34:44 PM 
224.0.0.15,10.15.20.10,Web-Server: Port Scan attempt,6/28/2011 2:57:25 
PM,6/28/2011 3:04:51 PM 
 
Participants demonstrated that they can conduct an investigation process. 
Participants filtered network activity on the Network Events viewer 
corresponding to the events that they received. The network filter reports logged 
such activity. The actual logs from the pilot study are given below. Each log entry 
shows the IP addresses and timespan used in filtering the activity. 
 
Network Filter used logs from the pilot study: 
192.121.86.47,10.15.20.10,6/28/2011 3:34:00 PM,6/28/2011 3:38:00 PM 
135.46.574.26,10.15.20.8,6/28/2011 3:34:00 PM,6/28/2011 3:42:00 PM 
10.30.4.6,132.15.623.4,6/28/2011 3:34:00 PM,6/28/2011 3:45:00 PM 
224.0.0.13,10.15.20.7,6/28/2011 3:25:00 PM,6/28/2011 3:45:00 PM 
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Participants demonstrated that they were able to classify the given events 
to different categories. The Event Classified reports logged the activity when each 
analyst classified the given event to one of the categories. The actual logs from 
the pilot study are given below. Each log entry shows the time and date when the 
event was generated and time and date when the event was classified. 
Event Classified logs from the pilot study: 
192.121.86.47,10.15.20.10,WEB-PHP: Cross Site scripting attack 
attempted,6/28/2011 3:36:37 PM,6/28/2011 3:40:30 PM,False 
 224.0.0.13,10.15.20.7,SMTP server : port scan attempt,6/28/2011 3:28:08 
PM,6/28/2011 3:47:47 PM,Recon 
 
Participants interacted on events that they observed. The combination of 
event shared reports and the replies from other analysts logged in the database 
demonstrates that there was interaction and that the interactions observed can be 
used to study team SA as per the ecological perspective of team SA [20]. The 
actual event shared logs and the actual replies from other analysts as observed 
from the pilot study are given below.  
 
Shared Event reports from Analyst 2: 
162.154.26.34,10.30.4.5,Workstation: UnCertified freeware dowloaded from 
http://sourceforge.net - possible virus,6/28/2011 3:31:28 PM,6/28/2011 3:43:03 PM 
 
Reply from Analyst 3 to the above shared event: 
“find out who downloaded the app.. find the user name .. ifthe user is an internal user 
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3) Team performance scores collected from the pilot study demonstrate CyberCog 
metrics to have potential relevance to analyst performance and SA. Table 3 
presents the scores collected from the pilot study. The CyberCog team 
performance scores include percentage scores for the events correctly categorized 
by the team as a whole, a percentage score for systems correctly identified as 
affected by the attack and a right-wrong score for the response action plan 
produced and attack path identified. The performance scores presented here are 
based on the outputs of the tasks (recreated real world analyst tasks) performed by 
the participants. Therefore, the scores obtained from running experiments using 
CyberCog can be used to measure analyst SA by using performance score 
approach to measuring SA. The data collected from the pilot study shows that the 
team on the whole was able to identify 40% of all the correct attack events, 95.8% 
of all the correct false events, 86.1% of all the correct reconnaissance events, 0% 
of all the correct failed events and 40% of all the affected systems. There was 
only one failed attack event in the scenario and it was wrongly classified as false 
positive. All of the percentage scores are calculated in the same way which is 
described as follows. If there are X events classified under a certain category and 
of the X events, Y events are the correctly identified events and if Z is the total 
number of correct events then the performance score is the percentage value on 
Y/Z. Similarly for the affected systems score, X is the number of all team 
identified affected systems, Y being the systems correctly identified as affected 
and Z being the total number of systems which are actually affected. 
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 Score Name Scores from Pilot study 
1 Attack Events 40% 
2 False Events 95.8% 
3 Recon Events 86.1% 
4 Failed Events 0% 
5 Affected Systems 40% 
6 Response Action Plan Wrong 
7 Attack Path Wrong 
Table 3: CyberCog Performance scores obtained from the pilot study 
 
The Response action plan and attack path are right-wrong scores obtained 
by evaluating the team produced plan and path against the correct plan and the 
actual path respectively. The teams with high SA will be able to ascertain the 
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Chapter 5 
CONCLUSION 
Cyber attacks growing in number and sophistication have caused cognitive 
overload in security analysts. The situation awareness needed for analysts to 
effectively conduct their tasks is impacted by this cognitive overload, as well as 
by ineffective tools which further overload the analysts with large amounts of 
disparate and false data. Security tools and technologies that aid the analyst in 
gaining situation awareness and tools that reduce cognition overload in analyst are 
needed. To build such tools that support SA, a good understanding of SA in the 
cyber defense context is required.  
The CyberCog STE system described in this thesis is capable of providing 
a rich and interactive environment for studying and measuring situation awareness 
in the cyber defense context by recreating all of the important tasks and 
interaction of a real world security analyst team. Task realism was achieved by 
incorporating the inputs obtained through interactions with real world analysts 
and subject matter during the iterative development phases. Visual observations 
of the task obtained from observing cyber defense exercise have also helped to 
achieve task realism. CyberCog is also capable of recreating real world team 
interaction relevant for SA studies as illustrated by the three types of team 
interaction.  The data such as the event logs, reports and performance scores 
obtained from the pilot test shows that the system is also capable of recording data 
needed to measure cyber situation awareness. 
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Future Work 
The current CyberCog system has only one cyber-attack scenario. More 
scenarios along with datasets of varying difficulty levels and varying degrees of 
data overload should also be included in future iterations of the system to build a 
richer STE. Building a suite of such scenarios will allow the experimenter to 
conduct multiple-scenario experiments.  Changing variables such as the number 
of attacks or number of false positives across scenarios will help in identifying the 
factors that affect SA in cyber analysts.  
Signal Detection Theory (SDT) measures [29] such as Hit, Miss, Correct 
Rejection and False Alarm calculated for events identified as attack-relevant and 
systems identified as affected by an attack will also be included in future versions 
of the system. It is a "Hit" if the participant classifies an actual attack event as 
attack event. It is a "Miss" if the participant classifies an attack event as a false 
positive. It is a "Correct Rejection" if the participant classifies an actual false 
positive event as false positive. It is a "False Alarm" if the participant classifies a 
false positive event as an attack event. Similarly for the systems the team 
classified as affected systems, it is a "Hit" if the team classifies an actual affected 
system as affected. It is a "Miss" if the team does not classify an actual affected 
system as affected. It is a "Correct Rejection" if the team does not classify a non-
affected system as affected. It is a "False Alarm" if the team classifies a non-
affected system as affected. 
More pilot studies will be executed to find operational gaps, to determine 
more cyber SA relevant measures, to improve usability of the system and also to 
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improve the current metrics. A complete and operational training procedure for 
the participants will be developed. Eventually the CyberCog STE will be used to 
conduct actual experiments to study and measure SA in the cyber defense context. 
The findings, which include factors affecting SA in security analysts, factors 
improving SA in security analysts and information needed to improve SA, 
obtained from running such experiments will be applied to designing new tools 
and training. 
The CyberCog system contributed from this thesis work demonstrates that 
it satisfies the requirements of a simulation environment essential for measuring 
individual and team SA in the cyber defense context such as task realism, team 
interaction and SA relevant metrics. Therefore, CyberCog is an adequate system 
that can be used to conduct human-in-loop experiments to obtain cyber situation 
awareness measures. 
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